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Introduction
The Eurozone currently includes 19 out of 28 Euro-
pean Union countries. Thus, Poland is in the minority 
of the EU countries that do not have euro. If one takes 
into consideration Bulgaria (currency board) and also 
Denmark (officially it is an exchange-rate with very low 
fluctuation margin towards euro +/0 2.25%) provides 
a fixed exchange-rate towards euro it turns out that 
Poland is in a small group of only six EU countries – 
Great Britain, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania and Croatia whose economies, citizens and 
economic entities are in danger of everyday exchange 
rate fluctuation and costs resulting from such a state. It 
must be noted that it is 15 years since Polish economy 
transferred to the floating exchange-rate regime on the 
12th of April, 2000. In practice it means everyday po-
tentially limitless changeability of zloty’s rate as its level 
is decided on by the market. If the interest in zloty is 
bigger, it causes its appreciation, whereas if it is lower it 
leads to its depreciation.
Aside from multi-dimensional analysis of advan-
tages and costs of implementing euro which is not the 
subject of this overview, it must be noted that economic 
entities from Eurozone countries have been in better 
competitive position for over 16 years. This allows them 
functioning on a shared EU market. It is especially 
important in the case of Polish economy. Its currency 
was either very strong (2001 and 2008) or very weak 
(2003–2004 and 2008–2009) – chart 1. For example, 
two-and-half-year period of the zloty’s weakening to-
wards euro lasting from the half of 2001 till the begin-
ning of 2004 (for about 46% in the case of medium 
rate from the level of 3.36 PLN to 4.90 PLN for EUR), 
and then the almost five-year period of strengthening 
(for about 34% up to the level of 3.21 for EUR in July 
2008) introduced Polish entrepreneurs (exporters and 
importers) as well as debtors (in foreign currency) to 
completely different conditions of functioning.
It led, for example, to loses in the case of some con-
tracts, issues with fluctuation or even insolvency and 
later on to limits in expansion on foreign markets, re-
fraining from entering such markets and, as a result, to 
employment reduction or shortage of new work places, 
limiting consumption and investment with all spectrum 
of consequences for the country’s economic situation, 
level of affluence and financial situation of the country.
Thus, the question about the accuracy of the float-
ing exchange-rate regime as the best solution for Pol-
ish economy seems natural. That is why the main aim 
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of this overview is to point out an alternative option 
and its advantages – an option that could possibly be 
not noticed at first glance, but would rapidly provide 
benefits and at the same time be a compromise towards 
strong and growing antipathy for Poland joining the 
Eurozone. According to the CBOS polling conducted 
in October 2014, 68% of respondents were against the 
euro introduction in Poland (only 24% were for intro-
duction). Extra support for introducing euro is drop-
ping systematically every year (it only rose at the time of 
the biggest crisis in 2008/2009). It must be noted that 
12 years ago in 2002 64% were for introducing euro1.
The European Exchange Rate Mechanism II
The European Exchange Rate Mechanism II is a system 
of stabilizing exchange rates. It was established on the 
1st of January, 1999 for EU countries which did not 
enter Eurozone. The system is used for maintaining sta-
bility of a country’s own currency towards euro. At the 
same time, it supports stabilization and development of 
the country’s and Europe’s economy. The participation 
in it is voluntary but, at the same time, it conditions 
entering into Eurozone. ERM II is the successor of the 
European Monetary System in which, from the 13th 
of March, 1979 up to the end of 1998, EU countries 
stabilized their exchange rates towards the European 
1 Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, Narastanie obaw 
związanych z wprowadzeniem euro, Komunikat z badań CBOS 
Nr 151/2014, Warszawa, listopad 2014 (cbos.pl – accessed 
20.04.2015). The research was conducted with the method 
of direct and computer-support interviewing in the period of 
9th–15th October, 2014 on the group of 919 adult inhabitants 
of Poland.
Currency Unit. A few decades ago West Europe noticed 
that the advantages of rate stability compensate for the 
costs of stabilization – particularly in the case of Eu-
ropean economies integrating with each other, which 
are characterized by high and growing level of openness 
and mutual trading exchange above the average level.
The ERM II participation includes the duty of 
maintaining the rate of one’s currency within the estab-
lished range. However, the standard range is broad and 
amounts to +/-15% towards the central rate2. It must 
be underlined that participation in the system provides 
a very measurable advantage in the form of guarantee of 
help from the European Central Bank in preserving sta-
bility should any tensions in the exchange rate occur3. 
Such help is automatic and limitless at the end of the 
range4; intervention inside the range would be, in the 
case of Poland, limited up to around 1.94 billion euros5. 
Such guarantee is an important factor which preserves 
stability and credibility of the economy.
Due to lack of support and more precise plans in 
case of Poland in Eurozone, the membership in the 
ERM II may be treated, only as an action ensuring safe-
ty and stabilization in Polish economy. In the future, it 
could be used for discussion on narrowing the fluctua-
tion range meaning the stronger position of zloty and 
maybe even the means for accelerating the process of 
euro implementation should any will or need appear. 
Eurozone membership must be supported with at least 
two-year period (at the moment of checking require-
ments) of membership in ERM II mechanism (without 
any major disturbances or devaluation of the central 
exchange-rate)6.
2 Sec. 2.1, Resolution of the European Council on the estab-
lishment of an exchange-rate mechanism in the third stage of eco-
nomic and monetary union, Amsterdam, 16th June 1997, Official 
Journal of the European Communities No 97/C 236/03.
3 Art. 6 and Art. 4, Agreement of 16 March 2006 between 
the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the 
Member States outside the euro area laying down the operating 
procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, Official Journal of the European 
Union No 2006/C 73/08.
4 Ibidem, Art. 7–8.
5 Attachment to the Agreement of 13 November 2014 be-
tween the European Central Bank and the national central banks 
of the Member States outside the euro area amending the Agree-
ment of 16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and 
the national central banks of the Member States outside the euro 
area laying down the operating procedures for an exchange rate 
mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union, Of-
ficial Journal of the European Union No 2015/C 64/01.















Chart 1. The exchange-rate level of zloty to euro in the pe-
riod from January 1999 to April 2015.
Source: self-reported data on the basis of Oanda, Historical Ex-
change Rates (www.oanda.com – accessed 10.04.2015).
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As ERM II does not require entering Eurozone and 
it enables preserving fluctuation of the exchange rate 
(hence, it does not require frequent rate intervention) 
as well as it also gives the help guarantee of EBC with, 
at the same time, offering the increase of one economy’s 
credibility, it sounds reasonable to implement zloty into 
ERM II – especially if relatively long periods of weak 
(or weakening) and strong (or strengthening) zloty in 
relatively short period of time from the point of view of 
a single entrepreneur or debtor are taken into consider-
ation. It is not about obvious advantages for the econ-
omy coming from better stability of the exchange rate 
in the form of better predictability, stability, extended 
scope of planning, improvement in concurrence or the 
economy’s credibility, but it is also about testing if Pol-
ish economy is able to develop and cope with crisis at 
the chosen level of exchange rate towards euro, i.e. at the 
level to which one does not have to hold on too much 
(and, within the allowed range of fluctuation, it could 
steer the rate) and one which, in case there is any need, 
could be corrected or leave the system. Such possibility 
does not exist if zloty is to be introduced to ERM II at 
the last moment before introducing euro – due to time 
pressure and the will of fulfilling the exchange rate cri-
teria. What is more important, it all may be done under 
the supervision and guarantee of help of the European 
Central Bank (such help serves as additional protec-
tion in the case of speculation attacks on zloty). Indeed, 
the exchange-rate stabilizing (whether it is within the 
currency system or not) may provoke speculations. It 
needs to be remembered that the floating exchange-rate 
regime absolutely does not serve as protection against 
such attacks. Western financial institutions possess such 
big capital that they are capable of destabilizing of every 
economy, not only of a developing economy, but also 
of an economy with the floating exchange-rate. On the 
other side, credible exchange-rate policy of the central 
bank enables the transfer of the weight of intervention 
onto the very participants of the currency market. In-
troducing zloty into the ERM II would provide with 
one more advantage, it would enable the choice of the 
level of currency conversion into euro that would be at-
tractive from the perspective of the Polish economy. It 
is crucial due to the importance of economic interests 
of both, supporters of the lower or stronger conversion 
rate. One must be aware of the fact that making a deci-
European Union (consolidated version), Official Journal of the 
European Union No 2012/C 326/15; Art. 3 of Protocol (No 13) 
on the convergence criteria attached to this Treaty.
sion of supporting anyone’s interest is, in the case of 
Poland, particularly difficult. Poland is still a developing 
economy that aims at catching up with Western coun-
tries. Hence, supporting concurrence seems essential. 
However, if we take into consideration immense depen-
dence on import (not only raw materials) as well as the 
issue of innovation, the choice of the compromise rate 
becomes really difficult.
If Poland intends to stay a full-right decision-maker, 
participant and beneficiary of the development of Eu-
rope’s economy, sooner or later it will have to join the 
Eurozone, which is mainly because staying on the lower 
margin of Europe will generate bigger costs (the net-
work effect7). Thus, using the present lack of pressure, 
economical consequences resulting from the floating ex-
change-rate, preserving zloty on different levels towards 
euro (very strong, strong, medium, weak, very weak) 
and eventual stabilization of zloty towards euro should 
be analyzed substantially, also publicly for the purpose 
of educating citizens and receiving support from some 
of them. A debate should also be held on a possibility 
of introducing zloty to the ERM II. The membership in 
ERM II is one of the criteria of convergence condition-
ing joining the Eurozone. However, it does not appear 
as a declaration of fast joining the Eurozone or any other 
pressure for deciding in the case. It is confirmed best 
by the situation of Danish krone which has been suc-
cessfully stabilized towards euro within the system since 
its beginning, that is from the 1st January 1999. Despite 
that, up to this day, Denmark has not accepted euro.
The experience of other EU countries
Some of the new EU members that already belong to 
the Eurozone, had implemented their currencies into 
the ERM II system long before joining the Eurozone 
(table 1).
Lithuanian litas has been in the ERM II system for 
more than 10 years, Latvian lats for more than 8 years 
and Estonian kroon for more than 6 years before trans-
ferring to the euro. Economic entities had many years 
to check if their economies will cope both in the period 
of good economic situation from 2008 and also in the 
7 Narodowy Bank Polski, Raport na temat pełnego uczest-
nictwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w trzecim etapie unii gospodar-
czej i walutowej, Warszawa 2009, p. 26 and Narodowy Bank 
Polski, Mechanizmy funkcjonowania strefy euro, Warszawa 
2013, pp. 59 i 179.
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situation of extreme financial-economical issues result-
ing from the financial crisis of 2008. In the case of three 
economies, this test was especially unique as all of these 
countries, out of their own initiative, used the fixed peg 
regime towards euro (Latvian lats was peged to euro with 
a very low range of fluctuation +/-1%). The example of 
Denmark is also worth mentioning: Danish currency has 
been in the ERM II system since its beginning, that is 
from the 1st January 1999 and before that, since 1979 
it has been stabilized towards ECU within the previous 
system of stabilizing – the European Monetary System. It 
must be also noted that Denmark, out of its own initia-
tive, officially maintains the peg of its currency on much 
narrower range than the standard one +/-15%, namely 
in the range of +/-2.25% from the central rate towards 
euro. The ERM II allows for stronger stabilization of 
the exchange rate8. In practice, the rate of Danish krone 
is yet more stable towards euro – with the fluctuation 
range of only around +/-0.5%9. Thanks to that, Danish 
8 Sec. 2.4., Resolution of the European Council on the estab-
lishment of an exchange-rate mechanism…
9 Danmarks Nationalbank, Foreign-Exchange-Rate Policy and 
ERM 2, 13th March 2014, www.nationalbanken.dk, [12.04.2015].
economy, although without euro, is not endangered with 
continuous fluctuations and uncertainty. This places 
its economic entities in much better position than, for 
example, Polish entities. At the same time, the ERM II 
membership strengthens the stability and trust towards 
the Danish economy and its economic policy thanks to 
the guarantee of help coming from the European Central 
Bank in case of any rate tensions.
Currently, 8 currencies of EU countries which re-
main outside of the Eurozone and the ERM II system 
are: Poland, Great Britain, Sweden, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Croatia.
The costs of stabilizing and destabilization 
of the exchange-rate
Indeed, being a part of the exchange-rate system is associ-
ated with certain responsibilities, costs and risk-similarly 
as to staying out of it. Accepted 30% amplitude of fluc-
tuation in ERM II is a very broad channel, especially in 
the context of a discussion about the need to stabilize the 
exchange-rate of zloty towards euro. Thus, keeping zloty 
in wide range should not generate any high stabilization 
Table 1. Comparison of the entire time of being in the ERM II by currencies of countries taking part in it.
country the date of entering ERM II the date of entering Eurozone the time of being  in ERM II
Slovenia 28th of June 2004 1st of January 2007 2,5 years
Cyprus 2nd of May 2005 1st of January 2008 2.5 roku
Malta 2nd of May 2005 1st of January 2008 over 2.5years
Slovakia 28th of November 2005 1st of January 2009 over 3 years
Estonia 28th of June 2004 1st of January 2011 6.5 years
Latvia 2nd of May 2005 1st of January 2014 8.5 years
Lithuania 28th of June 2004 1st of January 2015 10.5 years
Greece 1st of January 1999 1st of January 2001 2 years*
Denmark 1st of January 1999 – over 16 years** (so far)
* Greek Drachma took part in previous ERM from the 16th of March, 1998 to the 31st of December, 1998 which equals almost 3 years.
** Danish krone took part in the first ERM from its beginning, that is from the 13th of March, 1979; at the moment of implementing euro 
it automatically became the member of ERM II system and it still is a member of the system. Denmark has been stabilizing its currency 
towards euro and, before that, towards ECU for more than 36 years.
Source: self-reported data on the basis of European Central Bank, Estonian kroon included in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), 
Press Release, 27th June 2004, European Central Bank, Lithuanian litas included in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), Press Re-
lease, 27th June 2004, European Central Bank, Slovenian tolar included in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), Press Release, 27th 
June 2004, European Central Bank, Latvian lats included in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), Press Release, 29th April 2005, 
European Central Bank, Cyprus pound included in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), Press Release, 29th April 2005, European 
Central Bank, Maltese lira included in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), Press Release, 29th April 2005, European Central Bank, 
Slovak koruna included in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), Press Release, 25th November 2005, Danmarks Nationalbank, 
Foreign-Exchange-Rate Policy and ERM 2, 13th March 2014, www.nationalbanken.dk [12.04.2015], Z. Kontolemis, Exchange rates are 
a matter of common concern: policies in the run-up to the euro? Economic Papers N° 191, September 2003, p. 31.
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costs. In fact, if one were to decide on stronger stabiliza-
tion (as currently Denmark and before that Latvia, Lith-
uania, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta), such costs would be big-
ger and would require intense activity from the central 
bank on a country’s currency market. It must be noted 
that higher costs of functioning of the central bank mean 
the decrease of its profit or the risk of such occurrence, 
which is especially important for the Poland’s budget as 
96% of NBP’s profit for the previous year goes into this 
year country’s budget10. Here lies the answer for the ques-
tion about the lack of interest on the side of governments 
on the change of the exchange-rate regime in Poland.
Consequences of stabilizing and destabilizing should 
be pointed out. On such basis, a decision about the 
floating exchange-rate regime should be made. Nega-
tive consequences of unpredictability and continuous, 
strong fluctuations of zloty have been visible in Polish 
economy since the moment of introducing floating ex-
change-rate regime 15 years ago. The costs of stabilizing 
the exchange-rate mean lower income from the NBP’s 
profit into the country’s budget (or complete lack of 
such) as an effect of higher costs of NBP’s actions. That 
would mean cutting expenditure and/or either higher 
taxes or bigger budget deficit. Hence, the dilemma 
appears again: which interest is more important from 
the perspective of the future economic development of 
the country? It must be noted that, although for the 
economy each of these solutions brings certain costs, 
for the politicians the first option is much more con-
venient, namely the lack of stabilization of zloty thanks 
to which NBP does not generate costs of stabilizing the 
exchange-rate. Thus, it achieves better financial results 
that generate income of the country’s budget and sim-
plify maintaining economic policy. The amounts are not 
small. NBP’s profit in the last 14 years has amounted to 
almost 50 billion zloty – table 2.
Once, in 2007, the loss of 12.43 billion occurred, 
which equals a positive financial result of NBP in the 
period 2000–2013 in the amount of 37.49 billion. In 
this period, the country’s budget received from NBP 
47.63 billion11 which equals for example 17.1% of bud-
get income planned for 2014 (according to the budget 
act for 277.8 billion)12 or 5.8% of the national Polish 
10 Art. 69 par. 4 and Art. 62 Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 
o Narodowym Banku Polskim, Dz. U. 1997 Nr 140 poz. 938.
11 Ministerstwo Finansów, Sprawozdanie z wykonania 
budżetu państwa (roczne), issued for the period 2000–2013, 
www.mf.gov.pl [14.04.2015].
12 Ustawa budżetowa na rok 2014 z dnia 24 stycznia 2014 r., 
Dz. U. z 2014 r., poz. 162.
debt (amounting at the end of 2014 as 827 billion)13. 
It is interesting, however, that despite the accumulated 
financial result of NBP in this period on the level of 
37.49 billion, the country’s budget received from NBP’s 
profit 47.63 billion, i.e. over 10 billion more. A more 
detailed analysis of NBP’s financial situation reveals that 
it was possible thanks to the fact that the high loss of 
NBP in 2007 (12.43 billion) has not been fully cov-
ered up by now and, at the end of 2013, NBP’s balance 
shows 11.46 billion in the place of loss from the previ-
ous years14.
13 Ministerstwo Finansów, Zadłużenie sektora finansów 
publicznych IV kw/2014, Warszawa, 31 marca 2015, www.fi-
nanse.mf.gov.pl [14.04.2015].
14 Narodowy Bank Polski, Raport roczny 2013, Warszawa 
2014, www.nbp.pl [14.04.2015], p. 119.
Table 2. The net profit level of NBP and the amount of pay-
ment from its profit into the country’s budget for the given 
year* (in billions of zloty).
the NBP’s profit 
(in bln PLN)
the payment from  
the NBP’s profit into 


















* the payment from the profit for the given year comes to the bud-
get for the following year – for example, the payment from the profit 
in 2012 = 5.26 billion PLN came into the country’s budget in 2013.
Source: self-reported data on the basis of Narodowy Bank Polski, 
Raport roczny, Warszawa, selected issued for the period 2000–2013 
(www.nbp.pl – accessed 14.04.2015) and Ministerstwo Finansów, 
Sprawozdanie z wykonania budżetu państwa (roczne), issued for the 
period 2000–2013, www.mf.gov.pl [14.04.2015].
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 7/18/16 6:27 PM
23Magdalena Redo: Stabi l i zat ion of  Zloty  Within the  Exchange Rate  Mechanism II  (ERM II) . . .
Conclusion
The issue of whether to enter or not the Eurozone may 
be discussed for another 15 years, but it is a better solu-
tion to get to work, namely to publicly analyze all con-
sequences of zloty’s instability and its eventual stabiliza-
tion in order to educate the society on the specificity of 
Polish economy in the face of the Eurozone expansion 
as well as in the context of available solution in the form 
of ERM II. Perhaps it will enable for better understand-
ing of issues connected with the choice of a desired level 
of zloty’s rate towards euro from the perspective of Pol-
ish economy as a whole, as well as understanding the 
importance of the stabilization of zloty and introducing 
zloty into ERM II – without any declaration of transfer-
ring onto euro in order to use available tools for testing 
the chosen level of exchange-rate and competitiveness 
of Polish economy in this respect as well as a crucial ele-
ment supporting its stability and credibility. Economic 
stabilization that will be given once continuous fluctua-
tions of the zloty’s exchange rate are eliminated, should 
contribute to the growth of support for integrating with 
the Eurozone. Even if it does not happen, at least we will 
function in more stable economic reality, while having 
additional support from the European Central Bank.
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